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The 2008 election cycle awakened us to the possibility that religious communities, which are often
thought of as veritable constants in their political preferences, are open to change. Though a key
Democratic Party campaign theme, the evangelical community was arguably the best example of
change in 2008. Mike Huckabee, a former Baptist preacher and Arkansas governor, waged a serious
election effort by proposing innovative (relative to historical evangelical preferences) solutions on
poverty, climate change, and foreign aid. These issues were certainly not emphasized in Pat
Robertson’s run for president twenty years ago (Watson 1999), nor have they constituted the
evangelical community’s traditional concerns (Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2007).
Importantly, Huckabee was not a community aberration among his brethren. There is
evidence that evangelicals were either taking notes from the former Governor, or were otherwise
spurred to revise their collective political agenda in the last few years. Polls of the evangelical
community show evidence of shifting community views on issues ranging from loyalty to the
Republican Party to abortion (Pew 2006, 2007).1 And, while the opinion data suggest both
conservative and liberal swings within this religious cohort, the bigger story here may be that there
are community opinion swings in the first place.
After all, political shorthand, often espoused by media pundits and other observers, tends to
pigeon hole voter groups into preference and policy categories based largely on past behavior.
Indeed, conventional wisdom about American evangelicals and their policy preferences is only
beginning to move beyond the imposing shadows cast by the “culture warrior” class of community
leaders—Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, James Dobson among others. Of course, evangelicals are not
the only religious community showing signs of political change. Americans Muslims, broadly
speaking, have done so, especially in terms of participation in American political life (Pew 2007,
1

These shifts, while not dramatic turnarounds of historic community preferences, are sizeable enough to warrant

attention.
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Calfano, Djupe, and Green 2008). At the same time, the American Jewish community, long
concerned about church and state separation, has been found to exhibit flexibility on the teaching of
intelligent design in public school curricula (Robinson 2007).
These shifts in policy opinion within religious communities beg the question of why. If
religion is known for inculcating life-orienting values among believers, and any change in these
values has been considered to be, at best, glacial (Stark and Glock 1968; Leege 1993; Green, Guth,
Smidt, and Kellstedt 1996), what explains fluctuations in community preferences in relatively short
time spans? While this phenomenon may be attributable, in part, to differences in generational
cohorts, increased political and economic assimilation among group members, or some combination
thereof (see, e.g., Haddad and Esposito 2000), we believe that an overlooked explanation concerns
Deleted: influence

the potentially variable hierarchy of the basic value concepts communicated in religious
organizations to and among adherents (see Djupe and Calfano no date; Leege et al. 2002: 40-49).
Without doing violence to other explanations concerning why religious communities shift
either their locus of policy concerns or preferences, we are intrigued by the possible explanation for
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community change that is inherent in the influence religious values have on individual believers.
Aside from its focus on the metaphysical (see Pals 1996), religion’s primary contribution to human
existence concerns the values it establishes and promulgates relating to appropriate forms of human
Deleted: Geertz 1973;

relationships (Geertz 1973; Glock and Stark 1965; Leege 1993; Rokeach 1973; Wuthnow 1988).
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While it may be tempting to consider these values to be stable influences on believers, we argue that
a prima facie expectation of this kind misses the inherent reality that undergirds the influence of all
ideas, including religious values—they are instilled by some external agent and communication may
alter value hierarchies over time. the willingness of people to accept and interpret them more or less
uniformly. Arguably, another essential aspect of value acceptance and interpretation is generally
Comment [PAD1]: I don’t follow
here.

uniform exposure among group members.
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Importantly, and owing to recognition for how collectively held ideas gather consistency, the
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stability of religious value interpretations? hierarchies? cannot be based on some irrefragable
characteristic of the values themselves. Rather, value stability, if it is to be understood within a
political behavior framework, must be the product of collective interpretation by the population in
question. In other words, values may constitute stable influences on groups because the group is
generally monolithic in how it interprets and acts on the values, not because of any inherent
properties the values have. Given the evidence of systematic shift in political opinion within
religious communities described above, we ask whether religious value influence can have a
malleable effect on believer opinion formation. Value malleability would be presumably based on
variation in the exposure to and interpretation of religious values believers encounter. If this type of
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influence is found, it would suggest that the behavior of religious publics is conditioned, at least in
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part, on the very values often assumed to be a stable influence on it.
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To gain leverage on the possibly dynamic nature of religious value influence on attitude
formation, we consider whether the variable presentation of religious values affects believer policy
Deleted: opinion

attitudes. We do not attempt to trace changes in value influence over time among large religious
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cohorts. Our focus is, instead, on whether religious values, presented as variable experimental stimuli
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in disparate religious settings, produce distinct attitude shifts outcomes among believers compared
Deleted: as stimuli

to those not exposed to the values. If evidence is found to suggest the variable exposure of religious
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values affects attitudes, we believe it would show religious values to have the kind of dynamic
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influence on policy opinion that would explain shifts in religious community policy opinion.
While this type of study is new in the examination of religion, the political science literature
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has already adopted the perspective that values interact with beliefs to affect attitudes in a dynamic
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way (Barker and Carman 2000; Feldman 1988; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; McClosky and Zaller 1984;
Tetlock 1986; but see Goren 2005; Jacoby 2006). Newer work has engaged experimentation to
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evaluate when and for whom framed values operate (for a review, see Brewer and Gross 2005). For
Deleted: ,

instance, research has been done to assay what values are engaged when (Tetlock 1986), which
factors affect whether individuals adopt particular value frames (Barker 2005), and the degree to
which individuals think through value frames (Brewer 2001). The combination of findings allows for
considerable movement in attitudes given the variable ways that values can be engaged.
Our work differs from the value framing investigations in the political science literature on
at least two counts. First, we prime religious values, elevating the primed value in the respondent’s
mind. That is, we do not present a political situation in particular terms, as in framing, but simply
Deleted: in tandem with their

offer the values for subjects to consider before being exposed to policy questions. In this way, our
work takes the same strategy as Katz and Hass (1988), who selectively primed certain values to
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assess their effect on racial attitudes. Second, though we prime values, this is not a test of the
passive-receiver model (Zaller 1992) in the sense that this is not a straightforward example of (for
instance) priming individualism to predict individualist attitude-taking (Brewer and Steenbergen
2002). For one, the religious values we employ are far removed from politics. They also differ
significantly from the religious values, such as salvation, that Rokeach (1969a, 1969b) used. Instead
of dealing with an individual’s relationship with God, our values are concerned with the individual’s
Deleted: as mediated through religious
community

relationship to others.2
To use the settled public opinion idiom, we treat “religious values” as conceptions of how
things should be (see e.g., Rokeach 1973). Leege and Welch’s “foundational beliefs” are clearly
referring to such values: “Foundational beliefs guide individuals to what is problematic about the
world, offer ways to cope with or avoid problems, and provide ultimate solutions to these
problems” (1989: 140; see also Rokeach 1969a: 24). The most critical works on or related to religious
values are Rokeach’s (1969a, 1969b) two part series on the matter (but see Christenson 1976;
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In this way, the values in our experiment more closely resemble Stark and Glock’s (1968) ethicalism measures.
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Moberg 1970), Leege and Welch’s (1989) characterization of religious values as individualist or
communitarian, Allport and Ross’ (1967) famous formulation that religion can either serve the self
(extrinsic) or transcend narrow self-interest and guide the individual through religious principles
(intrinsic), and Benson and Williams’ (1982) multi-axis typological framework, which shows that
religious values can be thematically grouped into vertical (God-centered) and horizontal (community
centered) systems (see also, e.g., Williams 1996).
In contrast to work in political science, these perspectives on religious values share a
common problem from our point of view: the values are assumed to be part of the personality, or
are at least invariant. Though the particular focus varies, researchers most often have looked for
people with religious identities to hold different value sets, and then correlated those values with
attitudes and behaviors. While this approach has yielded insights, we believe that it obscures
considerable fluidity in the presentation of values within particular religious settings, and, thus,
assumes stability in individuals’ value hierarchies (Rokeach 1973). Perhaps motivated by the
normative role of values in society (e.g., Parsons 1937), this traditional approach imposes much
more stasis on religious populations than might be warranted.
A Dynamic Approach to Religious Value Influence
Working from the assumption that value exposure is key in determining how it is interpreted
by believers, we hone in on two key mechanisms in the exposure process. The first is the exposure
itself—elevating a value’s salience or importance in a subject’s mind. The second is the context (or
cue environment) in which this exposure occurs. Much of the work on the cue environment
(Goffman 1959, 1963; Barker 1968; Forgas 1976) shows that these contexts function as “symbolic
codes representing social norms and expectations about appropriate and inappropriate behavior”
(Forgas and Brown 1977: 636). Thus, consideration of context is a stimulant for reflection on the
particular experiences and interpretations believers associate with the religious values made salient to
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them. This is not unlike the importance researchers have attributed to self-referencing in shaping
attitudes (Brumbaugh 2002; Burnkrant and Unnava 1989).
In considering the role and nature of one’s individual religious context in affecting value
influence, attention invariably turns to the organizational properties of this context—the church,
synagogue, or mosque. Religious communities have been famously called the “plausibility
structures” (Berger 1967) that inform and sustain value influence. This process can occur through
sermons, informal discussion, and even less direct modes of communication (Leege and Kellstedt
1993; Leege and Welch 1989). Applying a modified version of self-referencing encouragement
(Sujan, Bettman, and Baumgartner 1993) might spur believer subjects to consider how values are
understood in their own religious context. As such, we use reference to a believer’s religious identity
as a way to tap the influence of religious context.
The importance of focusing on both value exposure and context is that context may alter the
aggregate directional effect of value priming to the extent that there are divergent understandings of
a value’s meaning with and across religious communities. Hence, we are concerned with two causal
elements concerning religious value influence—1) the effects of the primed (exposed) values
Deleted: interaction

themselves, and 2) the interpretive effects that a subject’s religious context has on the application of
these values in shaping policy opinion.

Deleted: religious identity (as reflected
through their personal
Deleted: )
Deleted: determining

Focus on these two mechanisms makes for a truly dynamic vision of religious influence. A
values focus allows for variation within religious bodies and across houses of worship and individual
believers as the presentation of values varies with organizational needs and theological dictates.
Other perspectives assume away intra-denominational or even intra-traditional variation through a
measurement strategy that assumes religious traditions to be adequate proxies for political
information exposure (Kellstedt et al. 1996; Layman 2001). Since the emphasis on particular values
may change from week to week, or even within a single communiqué in a particular religious
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context, we cannot ignore this potentially important variation. It is also important to note that our
approach provides a distinctly religious argument for flexibility and adjustment in religious bodies,
which neatly tucks into a line of research exploring the social dynamics of religious contexts. (Djupe
and Gilbert 2009; Gilbert 1993; Jelen 1992; Johnson and White 1967; Lenski 1962; Wald, Owen, and
Hill 1988).
Religious Values and U.S. Foreign Intervention
In order to begin to address the dynamic and contextual influence of religious values, we
examine the conditional effects of a religious value set on believer attitudes about U.S.
interventionism (both military and non-military). Considering the sheer weight given to debate
about America’s proper international role in recent years, this issue choice lends policy relevance,
but also creates a difficult test for our forthcoming hypotheses. As it stands, issues of U.S.
intervention are highly charged politically, so any effects found should gain greater credibility. Focus
on interventionism is also useful because it moves consideration of believer policy attitudes away
from the more traditional “culture war” concerns that have occupied much of the research agenda
on evangelicals (see Wilcox and Larsen 2006; Green et al. 1996).
Though consideration of the religious legitimacy of foreign intervention dates at least as far
back as the Thirty Years’ War and the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 (Philpott 2001), since the end of
the Cold War, and especially after September 11th, scholars have devoted increasing attention to the
rather complex relationship between religion and international relations. In fact, investigation of the
relationship between religion and U.S. foreign policy may be more important now than during the
Cold War. Without the ability to organize their thoughts around a Manichean world, citizens are
now left to their own devices to assess U.S. foreign policy. One important fallback resource,
according to Brewer and Steenbergen (2002), is how individuals view human nature—trusting
citizens tend to favor cooperative forms of intervention, while cynical ones hew to isolationism.
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Others have addressed the moral and religious dimensions of foreign intervention in support
of national interests (Appleby 2000; Carlson and Owens 2003). Of central concern has been whether
and how particular religious and political values should determine when an intervention might be
justifiable (Childress 1978; Johnson 1981). In the twentieth century, theologians, such as Reinhold
Niebuhr (1940; Wiersma 1995), considered the complex relationship between articulated religious
values and the realistic understanding that self-interested actors, including religious elites, develop
and promote these values (see McAfee Brown 1986 for an in-depth review). Ratifying that concern,
Hoeber Rudolph (2003) suggests the motivating tension of greatest historical intensity lies between
fragmentation and ecumenization, which we take as our inspiration to examine the essential religious
Deleted: from the group

values of exclusion and inclusion (Stark and Finke 2000).
Regarding religious exclusivity, Appleby suggests, “Enclave builders portray their religion’s
truths, ‘rights,’ and responsibilities as inherently superior to those of their rivals. . . . the strength of a
religious community’s claim to the loyalty of its adherents rests on the community’s ability to present
itself as the exclusive bearer of specific moral and/or material benefits” (2003, 181-182). On issues
of international importance, religion and its institutions have an even heightened stake in
maintaining their role as the primary lens through which believers interpret events and policy (see
Sahliyeh 1990; Hanson 2006). Of course, religious values relating to inclusion seek openness and
communion with others, including and especially those not part of the particular community (Sowle
Cahill 1994), are the obvious foil to the exclusivity of the “enclave builders.”
The emphasis placed on group-centered activities by exclusive religious values should center
subject views on the immediate needs of individual believers and their religious group. Exclusive
values, which accentuate the importance of maintaining intra-group integrity and personal piety, are
often held most dear by evangelicals or those identifying themselves as “born again” (Carroll and
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Roozen 1990), but they may resonate strongly in other communities that emphasize tensions with
Deleted: certain segments of the Muslim
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the world (Stark and Finke 2000).
In order to impact believer opinions on U.S. intervention policy, we expect that exposing
believers to exclusive values is akin to priming group categorization as seen in the social identity
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literature (see Billig and Tajfel 1973; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel 1981). We maintain that primed
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exclusive values should lead recipients to think about the world in a particular way. This means that
the in group/out group distinction that the exclusive values engender would be mapped onto an
international-level in-group/out-group categorization by the believer. Evidence showing believer
subjects exposed to the exclusive values form opinions favoring in-group (or U.S.) outcomes on the
intervention policy items will serve as confirmation that the exclusive religious values transcend
basic religious categorizations.
Of course, value priming constitutes only half of our experimental design. Elevating the
personal context in which a believer is exposed to the values themselves may play a critical
mediating role on whether a believer is able to link the exclusive values to the consideration of the
secular intervention policies. Context elevation may also impact believer opinions on a policy. This
may be especially the case in circumstances where one’s religious context places the believer at odds
with the United States and a state-centered approach to intervention. Obvious examples of this
might be Muslims whose religious context might place them at odds with U.S. policy. In such cases,
we would expect that, depending on the intervention item in question, religious context would
diminish the effect of the exclusive value priming on believer opinion formation.
Research Design
Our design variably primes inclusive and exclusive religious values and individual religious
context prior to soliciting opinions on six questions pertaining to U.S. foreign intervention (both
military and non-military). The intervention survey uses a 2x2x2 design that randomly assigned 1)
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subject exposure to exclusive religious values, 2) the priming of these values prior to the intervention
policy questions (our dependent variables), and 3) the placement of a religion identity battery (with
inquiries as to subject attendance at religious services, view of the scared religious text associated
with the subject’s faith, and an indicator of how much the subject is guided by religion in daily life)
to trigger consideration of a believer’s religious context prior to the religious values. Placement of
the identity battery ahead of the religious values is intended to trigger subject reflection on
contextual characteristics that we hypothesize will moderate value influence.
Unlike some studies whose experimental findings are considered less reliable because of
concerns with the use of a convenience sample (see Sears 1986), we elected to conduct the study of
religious values among subjects in actual houses of worship. By doing so, we have not only cleared a
significant methodological hurdle in the use of experimental designs, but have positioned our
examination of the role religious values play in determining attitudes on U.S. intervention within the
actual milieu that we hypothesize conditions policy opinion.
Our surveys were distributed in houses of worship in the evangelical, mainline Protestant,
Jewish, and Muslim communities in northeastern United States in the spring and summer of 2008.
In all, one mainline Protestant congregation, two evangelical congregations, two Jewish
congregations within the Reform tradition, two Mosques and one Islamic Center agreed to
participate on the condition that the names of the houses of worship are kept confidential.3 Leaders
(lay and/or ordained) from the houses of worship granted the authors and/or their research
assistants access to an agreed upon set of worship services where the surveys (which were
condensed onto two sides of a legal sized document) would be randomly distributed.
In most cases, the surveys were inserted at random via the weekly bulletin provided by the
house of worship. In a select set of cases, the surveys were distributed separately during the service
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itself. In order to maximize survey distribution to the religious communities, each house of worship
made the survey available to anyone who had heard that a survey was distributed, but who did not
receive one to complete for whatever reason at the service. All subjects present at the time the
survey was distributed were instructed (usually by the leader of the worship service) to complete the
survey either during the service or immediately thereafter (where they were collected by the authors
and/or their research assistants). A minority of subjects elected to return the surveys the following
week, which were then returned to the authors or their research assistants.
In all, 734 surveys were returned across the nine houses of worship used in this study. Just as
Wald, Owen, and Hill (1988) found in their survey of religious service attendees, however, not all
surveys were returned with usable data. We follow Wald et al.’s approach of incorporating only
those surveys that contained information for all items used in our analysis. This drops our n to 524,
which contains usable responses from 87 evangelical Protestants, 135 mainline Protestants, 151
Muslims, and 152 Jews. Since we are exploring a between-subject group effect, we do not believe
that the relative difference in subject group n is problematic.
While not as controlled a delivery mechanism for the stimulus as would normally exist in
executing experimental designs, we believe that, given the constraints involved in conducting
experimental designs in houses of worship (which is, to our knowledge, and unprecedented
undertaking), any problems with validity posed by duplicated survey submissions or subject
substitutions in completing the survey are minimal. We have this confidence, in part, because leaders
in the houses of worship were very cooperative in monitoring who in their communities returned
completed surveys. Since most of the houses of worship have 300 or fewer regularly attending
members, the leaders themselves were very familiar with members of their faith communities. This
gave them a rough idea as to who had likely not been present during the service where the surveys
were originally distributed. At the same time, the notion that a single person would take the time to
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request, complete, and return a large number of social science-based surveys strikes us as slightly
unrealistic given the nature of concerns on the minds of most people attending religious services.
Finally, concerning the possibility of subject substitution—whereby a subject passed the survey off
to another person to complete and return—we argue that only in the case of a subject giving the
survey to a person not sharing their religious identity (e.g., a Muslim giving the survey to an
evangelical to complete), would subject substitution affect response validity. We also find this
scenario unlikely.
Of course, this does not mean that we present the subjects participating in our experiment as
broadly representative of their respective religious traditions—only that we feel great confidence that
our design addresses the growing concern political scientists have with reliance on convenience
samples. While executing survey-embedded experiments in designs reaching representative samples
is ideal, given that subjects are likely to respond to stimuli in roughly the same way as average
Americans (especially once appropriate controls are applied—Lucas 2003), we have increased
confidence that the results found have adequate external validity. Finally, we are not concerned with
generating point estimates of religious value effects, but, instead, knowing if conditional value
presentations instigate some attitudinal response (Kam, Wilking, and Zechmeister 2007). This also
lessens the complications inherent in not using a representative sample of the religious communities.
Contextual Value Effects on Interventionism
Our six dependent variables constituting U.S. interventionism are taken from the survey
items that were asked of subjects during the course of the experiment. In conditions where the
exclusive values are primed, the dependent variable questions came after the values. In conditions
where the religious battery was primed, the dependent variables came after the religious battery.
Where both the values and battery were primed (and in which case the battery preceded the values)
the dependent variables were placed after both the values and religious battery.
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Each of the six dependent variables deals with a particular aspect of U.S. intervention in the
affairs of other entities—either states or terror groups. Dependent variable one (DV1) reads “The
U.S. should intervene in the affairs of foreign states to prevent genocide.” DV2 states “The U.S. is
justified in waging a pre-emptive strike against states it believes pose a threat to its national security.”
DV3: “The U.S. should intervene in the affairs of foreign states only if it has the support of the
United Nations.” DV4: “The U.S. should use its influence and resources to shape the political
environments of other nations.” DV5: “The U.S. should intervene in the affairs of foreign states to
protect its own economic and political interests.” DV6: “The United States is justified in warring
against states and terror groups espousing radical Islamic ideology.”
Values for the dependent variables are based on responses to two 0-10 scales per variable
that asked subjects to list the number of arguments in favor and arguments opposed to the each dependent
variable statement. Subjects were free to create the affirming and opposing arguments on their own.
They were asked only to enter the numerical count of the affirming and opposing arguments they
could think of in each of two boxes on the survey sheet (which were designated “arguments in
favor?” and “arguments opposed?” respectively). To create our dependent variable measures, we
took the numerical difference between the two argument scales for each variable by subtracting the
number of arguments opposed from the number of arguments in favor. This created a variable
range of -10 to 10.
Based on the assumption that primed exclusive values lead subjects to emphasize ingroup/out-group differences, we take it as evidence that these group differences are imputed to U.S.
intervention policy if the values create a significant and negative influence on subject arguments
relating to genocide (DV1), a significant and positive influence on arguments concerning pre-emption
(DV2), a significant and negative influence on intervention based on U.N. approval (DV3), a
significant and positive influence on the U.S.’s ability to shape the political environments of other
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nations (DV4), a significant and positive influence on U.S. intervention to protect its economic and
political interests (DV5), and a significant and positive influence in warring against states and terrorists
espousing radical Islam (DV6).
Our six models contain the three experimental conditions—the priming of religious values,
subject exposure to exclusive values, and the priming of one’s religious identity. We interact each of
these three conditions in the models. We also include the following six controls: 1) frequency of
subject attendance at religious services, 2) subject political ideology, 3) subject sex, 4) an evangelical
dummy, 4) a Muslim dummy, and 6) a Jew dummy (mainline Protestants serve as the baseline
category).
Before moving to a consideration of our results, it is important to comment on the expected
influence of the religious identity battery given the setting in which the experiments were conducted.
Arguably, priming a subject’s religious identity while she is participating in an experiment at her
house of worship is unnecessary. We suggest, however, that there is no way to tell what types of
concerns were salient to the subjects prior to the experiment. In other words, while the subject may
have been sitting in church that morning, the nature (and potential influence) of his personal
religious identity may not have been on his mind, especially if attendance at religious services is a
routine event for him. In order to address this possibility, we believe that the religious identity
battery, while perhaps a redundant influence in some cases, is a necessary inclusion in the
experiment to ensure that any mediating influence of one’s religious context is directly represented
in the experimental mechanism.
Primed and Contextual Value Effects on Interventionism
As mentioned above, we expect that the influence of one’s primed religious identity will
counter the influence of exclusive values, at least on some policies. Logically, the policies on which
this countervailing effect would be found likely depends on the religious context in question. Since
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we draw on subject responses from all three monotheistic faiths, it is worthwhile to create
interactions between the religious identity and subject religious tradition dummies to examine
whether priming a Muslim religious identity (for example) has an effect distinct from priming an
evangelical one.
In doing so, we found that only in the case of DV3, which pertains to U.N. approval of U.S.
intervention, were these interactions statistically significant. Specifically, both Jews and evangelicals
who had their religious identity primed prior to receiving the dependent variable statements had a
higher number of arguments in favor of subjecting U.S. intervention to U.N. approval (results not
shown), while those exposed to the exclusive values in the absence of identity priming had a
significantly high number of arguments against the U.N. approval statement. That these interactions
were not insignificant in the remaining models, and in the interest of parsimony, we present the six
models without the identity interactions. Results from the first three models are reported in table 1.
Significant interactions are graphed in figures 1-4.
[Table 1 about here]
[Figures 1-4 about here]
As expected, the priming of exclusive religious values significantly affects subject arguments
for and against the six intervention policy statements. Overall, the effect is as we hypothesized—
priming the exclusive values makes subjects more supportive of the U.S. having carte blanche in how it
deals with out-group entities. That said, the results from model one are a little more complex than
expected. There, the priming of exclusive values has a positive effect on supportive arguments
among subjects (albeit one just outside of significance), while the triple interaction between the three
experimental conditions serves to significantly reduce the number of positive arguments.
Specifically, the priming of exclusive religious values increased the number of arguments in favor by
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1.961 (p <.055), while the triple interaction (which included the priming of subject religious identity)
decreased arguments in favor by 2.745(see Figures 1 and 2).
In this instance, at least, what to expect from the influence of primed religious identity is not
entirely clear. Neither, for that matter, is the influence of the exclusive values themselves. This is
because the issue of intervening to prevent genocide, when considered from the vantage point of a
U.S.-based outcome, could be viewed either as the U.S. determining it wants to intervene in
pursuing some national interest, or as the nation being forced to act in addressing an international
crisis. This dualism in interpreting the genocide intervention may explain the significant and
countervailing results between the variables 6 and 7 in model one. What we can say from this first
model, however, is that the elevation of religious identity in tandem with the primed exclusive values
reduces the arguments in favor of genocide intervention among the subjects
In contrast, results from table one’s second and third models in are directly in-line with our
expectations concerning the role of exclusive values in moving subjects toward the acceptance of
intervention arguments favoring the U.S. In terms of justification to wage a pre-emptive policy
(DV2), subjects exposed to the exclusive religious value have an increase in the arguments in favor
of 3.352 (the triple interaction priming religious identity is not significant). The exact opposite is true
in regard to the U.S. needing U.N. approve to intervene (DV3), as subjects primed with exclusive
values have a decrease in arguments in favor on that measure of 6.322 (again, the triple interaction is
not significant) (see Figures 3 and 4).
[Table 2 about here]
Table 2 contains results for last three models. Again, our expectations are confirmed in
regard to primed exclusive religious values and their effects on subject views of interventionism. On
the question of whether the U.S. should shape the political environments of other nations (DV4),
subjects primed with exclusive religious values had an increase in the arguments in favor of 3.242
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(see Figure 4). An even larger effect on arguments in favor was found for DV5, which concerns U.S.
intervention to protect its economic and political interests. Subjects exposed to exclusive religious
values had an increase in arguments in favor of DV5 of 5.457 (see Figure 5). The expected effect of
exclusive values is also present in for the DV6 model, although it is located in the triple interaction.
There, the number of arguments in favor of the U.S. warring against states and terrorists espousing
radical Islam increases by 2.425 when subjects when both the exclusive values and the religious
identity have been primed (see Figure 6). Overall then, we are confident that our research
expectations concerning the priming of exclusive religious values has been confirmed.
Discussion & Conclusion
Our research expectations were that exposure to religious values and elevation of a believer’s
religious context (via religious identity) would show significant influence on policy measures. The
results are generally consistent – primed values otherwise disconnected to politics can influence the
direction of support for a wide variety of policy measures. Given the distance between the exclusive
religious values and state intervention policy, it is plausible, and the results support the explanation,
that those encountering the exclusive values transpose the value’s message to international policy
considerations, perhaps in a manner similar to social identity theory in which the in-group is
preferenced over the out-group. In this case, the primed exclusive values consistently move subject
policy arguments in the direction of favoring U.S. latitude in pursuing intervention, an effect
consistent with favoring the in-group. In contrast to the value elevation, believer religious identity
was found not to have the kind of intervening effect we envisaged. This may be because the
experiments themselves were conducted in a religious context, thereby diluting the effect of the
identity battery on subjects. It is left to future research to disentangle any differences in effect
between priming identity in religious vs. non-religious settings.
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Overall, these results point to quite a different conception of the two message model (in
which stable values encourage adoption of consonant messages and rejection of oppositional
communication, tempered by reception and motivation) (Zaller 1991). Instead, the values here
appear rather unstable, subject to priming even in the artificial context of an opinion survey. This
finding raises an objection to conceptions of values as fixed or at least stable, though stability may
come from the stable presentation of values over time, a role that religious communities have long
been credited as having (e.g., Tocqueville 1994[1835]). Moreover, value priming fixes attention on
particular messages, and consonance is gauged by how they are framed, not by their direction.
The implication is probably not rampant instability in public opinion, but the findings do
suggest a number of forces acting to sustain opinion stability: stable involvement in social
organizations, the consistent emphasis in those organizations on particular values, divergent
interpretation of those values across society, consistent interpretation in a particular community, and
skepticism about how others attempt to interpret the values. Since a significant number of these
forces do change for individuals over even short periods of time – see, for instance Djupe, Sokhey
and Neiheisel (2008) – we should expect to see turbulence in individual opinions that more or less
maintain aggregate stability. This helps to explain some of the changes occurring in the religious
communities discussed at the outset of this project—changes that are not dramatic departures from
the historical positions these communities have held, but are noticeable fluctuations nonetheless.
This perspective should be marked as a significant shift in the study of religion and politics,
which has shied away from operationalizing the politically salient values religion imparts (though see
similarly oriented work by Leege and Kellstedt 1993; Leege and Welch 1989; Mockabee, Wald, and
Leege 2007), refrained from acknowledging a significant amount of diversity within religious
communities, or hesitated emphasizing communication within churches (though see Djupe and
Gilbert 2003, 2009). The fact that we can vary the presentation of values and see opinions shift
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while holding religious tradition constant (by statistical control and research design) suggests why
religious traditions contain considerable variance in the politics of affiliated members.
In this dynamic view of religious influence, the effect of core religious values will vary as
individuals, in consort with a particular religious community, wrestle with vague dictates and secular
policy issue domains. There is little doubt, then, that religious communities can arrive at attitudes
and behaviors that may differ considerably from other collections of people wearing the same
religious label (Djupe and Gilbert 2009; Gilbert 1993; Jelen 1992; Roozen, McKinney, and Carroll
1984; Wald, Owen and Hill 1988).
This conclusion is a far cry from the commonly accepted operationalization of religion’s
political content using a measure as blunt and static as a religious tradition (Kellstedt et al. 1996: 175177; Layman 2001). Moreover, it is notable because of the dozens of studies done with the
American National Election Studies (ANES) measure since 1992, none include an operationalization
of religious values, or the broader notion of religious worldviews. As Leege and Kellstedt note, the
ANES measures are simply not suitable for this purpose (1993: 220). Instead the ANES measures
have examined “vertical” religious links (i.e., with God), instead of emphasizing the far more
politically salient “horizontal” links (i.e., with other humans) that religious organizations also attempt
to establish (Leege and Welch 1989). Overall, these results represent an important first step in the
investigation of variable value influence, and are clearly not the end. More research is needed with
older adults, special religious groups, and different policy domains. We also urge consideration of
different civil society domains beyond American religion.
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Appendix: Variable Coding
Intervention dependent variables: The six statements read, (1) The U.S. should intervene in the
affairs of foreign states to prevent genocide (2) The U.S. is justified in waging a pre-emptive strike
against states it believes pose a threat to its national security; (3) The U.S. should intervene in the
affairs of foreign states only if it has the support of the United Nations; (4) The U.S. should use its
influence and resources to shape the political environment of other nations; (5) The U.S. should
intervene in the affairs of foreign state to protect its own economic and political interests; (6) The
United States is justified in warring against states and terror groups espousing radical Islamic
ideology. Construction of the variable used is described in the text.
Political ideology: “Now, thinking of your general political views, which of these labels best
describes you?” 1) strongly liberal, 2) liberal, 3) moderate, 4) conservative, 5) strongly conservative.
Attendance: “Aside from weddings or funerals (weddings or bar mitzvahs/weddings or funerals), I
typically attend church (synagogue/mosque)” (1) once a week or more (2) once or twice a month
(3) about once a month (4) several times a year (5) rarely, if ever
Sex: “What is your gender?” (0) Male (1) Female
Religious values: The treatment variable is coded 1 if the subject was exposed to the exclusive
value statements. The values were preceded by the instructions: “There are many values that make
a person a good person of faith. Think seriously about it and then please tell me if you agree that
the following values are important to being a good religious person.” Exclusive Religious Values: “To
be true to your faith, it is important to keep company with other people of your faith.” “To be true
to your faith, it is important to shop as much as possible at stores owned by people of your faith.”
Both statements are followed with response options (which we do not use in this analysis): strongly
agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree.

21

Religious Identity Battery: If the identity battery preceded the religious values, it is coded 1,
otherwise it followed the dependent (intervention) variables and is coded 0. In addition to the
“attendance” indicator already discussed, the identity battery included the following questions. (A)
How much guidance does religion provide you in your daily life? (1) no guidance at all (2) some
guidance (3) quite a bit of guidance (4) a great deal of guidance; (B)—included on evangelical and
Mainline Protestant instruments only— Do you agree with this statement? I consider myself a “born
again” or evangelical Christian. (1) strongly agree (2) somewhat agree (3) neither agree nor disagree
(4) somewhat disagree (5) strongly disagree; (C) Which view comes closest to your view of the Bible
(Torah/Koran)? (1) The Bible (Torah/Koran) is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally,
word for word (2) The Bible (Torah/Koran) is the inspired word of God but not everything in it
should be taken word for word (3) The Bible (Torah/Koran) is a good book because it was written by
wise people, but God had nothing to do with it (4) The Bible (Torah/Koran) was written by men so
long ago that it is worth little today.
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Table 1
The Effects of Religious Value Priming and Religious Context on Subject Attitudes
Concerning U.S. Intervention and Pre-emption

1) Religion battery
primed
2) Values primed
3) Exclusive Values
4) Identity * Values
5) Identity * Exclusive
6) Values * Exclusive
7) Identity * Exclusive
* Values

DV1: U.S. should
intervene in foreign
states to prevent
genocide.
p
β
1.962 .163
.551
-2.934
1.343
1.072
1.961
-2.745

DV2: U.S. is justified in
pre-emption if states
pose threat to national
security.
β
P
1.471 .016

.435
.000
.168
.224
.055
.050

.553
.668
-.853
-.952
3.352
.862

.408
.268
.355
.254
.001
.516

DV3: U.S. should
intervene in foreign
states only with United
Nations’ approval.
β
p
-.101 .985
.795
.079
-1.026
.118
-6.322
1.322

.188
.885
.218
.875
.000
.270

Controls
.063 .593
-.286 .007
8) Religious attend
-.165 .186
9) Political ideology
-.120 .424
.438 .002
-.162 .208
-.113 .750
-.200 .553
-.024 .937
10) Sex
11) Evangelical
.575 .294
.789 .093
.116 .823
12) Muslim
-1.201 .020
.136 .757
-.346 .477
13) Jew
.750 .105
-2.170 .000
-.360 .390
-1.595 .033
1.579 .020
Intercept
3.698 .000
.160
.284
Adjusted R2
.159
8.68 .000
F
8.641 .000
17.008 .000
Note: The DV statements are shortened for space considerations; see the Appendix for full coding.
n =524. OLS coefficients in two-tailed tests.
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Table 2
The Effects of Religious Value Priming and Religious Context on Subject Attitudes
Concerning U.S. Political and Economic Interests and Radical Islam
DV4: U.S. should
shape other nations’
political
environments.
1) Religion battery
primed
2) Values primed
3) Exclusive Values
4) Identity * Values
5) Identity * Exclusive
6) Values * Exclusive
7) Identity * Exclusive
* Values

β
p
.086 .890
.233
.109
-.307
.611
3.242
-1.522

DV5: U.S. should
intervene in foreign
states to protect its
economic and political
interests.
β
P
-.083 .883

.731
.859
.743
.471
.001
.259

-.061
-.064
1.416
.645
5.457
-1.996

.921
.909
.098
.405
.000
.105

DV6: U.S. justified in
warring against states
and terrorists espousing
radical Islam.
β
p
.590 .371
1.805
.061
-1.648
-.284
.974
2.425

.013
.925
.098
.752
.350
.091

Controls
.216 .048
.250 .050
8) Religious attend
.181 .130
.361 .006
.376 .015
9) Political ideology
.308 .033
10) Sex
.109 .750
-.786 .012
-.056 .878
11) Evangelical
-.217 .681
.694 .216
1.646 .001
12) Muslim
-1.366 .006
-1.144 .030
-1.599 .000
13) Jew
-.816 .058
-.722 .125
1.374 .006
-1.486 .032
-3.673 .000
Intercept
-.648 .394
.300
.118
.083
Adjusted R2
4.662 .000
6.396 .000
18.260 .000
F
Note: The DV statements are shortened for space considerations; see the Appendix for full coding.
n =524. OLS coefficients in two-tailed tests.
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Figure 1: U.S. Should Intervene in Foreign States to Prevent Genocide (Triple Interaction)

No Exclusive

Exclusive

Figure 2: U.S. is Justified in Pre-emption if States Pose Threat to National Security

No Exclusive
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Exclusive

Figure 3: U.S. Should Intervene in Foreign States only with United Nations’ Approval

No Exclusive

Exclusive

Figure 4: U.S. Should Shape Other Nation’s Political Environments

No Exclusive
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Exclusive

Figure 5: U.S. Should Intervene in Foreign States to Protect Its Economic and Political Interests

No Exclusive

Exclusive

Figure 6: U.S. Justified in Warring against States and Terrorists Espousing Radical Islam
(Triple Interaction)

No Exclusive
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Exclusive

